The Effects of Polish Special Economic Zones on Employment and Investment: Spatial Panel Modelling Perspective. by Cizkowicz, Piotr et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Effects of Polish Special Economic
Zones on Employment and Investment:
Spatial Panel Modelling Perspective.
Piotr Cizkowicz and Magda Cizkowicz-Pekala and Piotr
Pekala and Andrzej Rzonca
Warsaw School of Economics, National Bank of Poland
20. March 2015
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/63176/
MPRA Paper No. 63176, posted 23. March 2015 15:15 UTC
  
The Effects of Polish Special Economic Zones on 
Employment and Investment: Spatial Panel Modelling 
Perspective. 
 
 (March 2015)  
 
Piotr Ciżkowicz†, Magda Ciżkowicz-Pękała‡,  
Piotr Pękała*, Andrzej Rzońca** 
 
 
Abstract: We estimate the set of panel and spatial panel data models of employment and 
investments for 379 Polish counties over the period 2003-2012. We take advantage of a unique 
firm-level dataset for Polish Special Economic Zones (SSEs), which includes about 30,000 
observations. We find that SSEs have substantial positive effects on employment: jobs in a given 
SSE create jobs outside the SSE in hosting county and even more jobs in neighbouring counties. 
Effect of SSEs on investments is weaker, but still positive. Investments in a given SSE neither 
crowd out nor crowd in investments outside the SSE. Thereby, they add one to one to capital 
stock in hosting county. Our findings are robust to changes in estimation methods, sample 
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1. Introduction 
After the collapse of the communist bloc in 1989, countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including 
Poland, started a rapid political and economic transformation. In the course of this process, Poland 
substantially narrowed the development gap against wealthier economies of Western Europe (see, e.g. 
BALCEROWICZ et al., 2013). However, differences in economic performance between particular 
regions within Poland remained a persistent feature of Polish transition (see, e.g. CIŻKOWICZ et al., 
2014). As soon as 1994, Polish government implemented special economic zones (hereafter: SSEs - pol. 
Specjalne Strefy Ekonomiczne1) as a place-based policy aimed at mitigating these differences by inter alia 
attracting investment and creating new jobs. Increasing reliance on SSEs has been mirrored in both the 
gradual expansion of SSEs’ territory and the extensions of their operating time horizon2. Support for 
enterprises operating in SSEs involves substantial fiscal costs3, so the problem of SSEs’ effectiveness as a 
policy tool becomes vital. The problem may be divided into two questions:  
• firstly, what explains considerable differences in first round effects, i.e. why some SSEs attract more 
firms than the others;  
• secondly, what is the impact of firms located in SSEs on economic outcomes outside SSEs territory.  
Our research seeks to answer the second question4. We estimate the set of panel and spatial panel data 
models of employment and capital outlays for 379 Polish poviats (eng. counties; LAU-1, previously 
NUTS-4 regions) over the period 2003-2012. To assess the impact of SSEs we include employment and 
investment of SSE-based firms in the set of explanatory variables in the models. We apply an approach 
proposed by LESAGE and PACE (2009) in order to correctly interpret spatial effects resulting from the 
estimates. 
Our main findings are as follows: 
Firstly, SSEs have substantial positive effect on employment. Every 100 jobs in a given SSE 
create, on average, about 72 jobs outside the SSE in hosting county and 137 jobs in neighbouring 
counties. Secondly, effect of SSEs on investments is weaker, but still positive. Investments in a 
given SSE do not crowd in investments outside the SSE, but do not crowd them out either. 
Thereby, investments in SSEs add one to one to capital stock in hosting counties. The findings are 
1 In the remainder of this paper we use acronyms “SSEs” to indicate the Polish special economic zones created by the Act of 
1994, and “SEZ” to indicate the broader set of geographically-targeted investment incentive schemes in general. 
2 In 2013, SSEs operations were extended until 2026. 
3 Until the beginning of 2012, the value of public aid extended to companies operating in the SSEs amounted to PLN 10.5 bn. On 
top of that expenditures on infrastructure development and marketing were close to PLN 3.0 bn (MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, 
2013). 
4 In CIŻKOWICZ et al. (2015) we seek to address the first part of the question.  
                                                          
robust to changes in estimation methods, sample composition, set of explanatory variables and 
spatial weight matrix. 
The paper makes three main contributions to the literature on the topic. 
Firstly, while SSEs in Poland have been functioning for over 20 years, a precise, robust and 
comprehensive analysis of SSEs impact on regional economic outcomes is still lacking5. We seek to fill 
this gap using a unique firm-level dataset for Polish SSEs, which to our best knowledge has not been 
exploited by other researchers. The scope of the dataset encompasses all companies operating in SSEs 
between 2003 and 2012 and amounts to about 30,000 observations. The dataset contains information 
about individual companies’ investments outlays, retained and newly created jobs and the sectors in 
which particular firms operate. We combined the information with regional data from the Central 
Statistical Office describing various characteristics of counties in which SSEs are located. The dataset 
allows to expand the analysis beyond the - typically studied in the literature - direct employment and 
investment creation that takes place on the SSEs territories and to account not only for the cross-sectional, 
but also dynamic and spatial effects of SSEs’ functioning. 
Secondly, the vast majority of the empirical research is based on dummy variable indicating zone 
existence in a particular region and time period. The variable is incorporated into (cross-section or panel 
data) standard model of regions’ GDP, employment or investment and the estimates are interpreted as the 
average impact of SEZ on economic outcomes of a hosting region. Instead, we use measures of first 
round effects of SSEs functioning – the level of employment and capital outlays by the companies 
operating in SSE in particular county and time period. This approach, which to our best knowledge has 
not been used previously in the literature, enables us to avoid some principal limitations of dummy 
variable approach. Firstly, we are able to distinguish between first round effects of SSE’s creation (i.e. 
scale of activity of firms located on the SSEs’ territory) from induced effects (i.e. the impact of 
companies located in the SSE’s territory on economic outcomes of firms located in the hosting region, but 
outside this territory). Based on this decomposition, important conclusions might be drawn with regard to 
the existence of crowding-in/crowding-out effects and spillovers from SSEs functioning. This type of 
reasoning, which is the core of our analysis, is not possible with the use of dummy variable. Secondly, 
dummy variable approach assumes that all SSEs are homogenous, while in fact they differ with respect to 
the scale of financial incentives, quality of infrastructure, available area, etc. This heterogeneity results in 
considerable differences (both in time and cross-section dimension) with respect to the number, scale and 
characteristics of firms located in SSEs territories. Dummy variable approach averages out these 
differences, which may result in biased estimates of SSEs’ impact on economic outcomes of hosting 
region. Our approach, on the contrary, fully exploits these differences. Thirdly, using SSE-based 
5 See Section 2 for the analysis of related literature. 
                                                          
employment and investment as explanatory variables allows us to estimate models with fixed effects 
which capture unique characteristics of particular regions. In the dummy variable approach fixed effects 
are indistinguishable from the effects of SSE functioning.  
Thirdly, we use spatial panel data models. They allow us to distinguish three types of induced effects of 
SSE on employment and investments: effects outside SSE in hosting counties, externalities to 
neighbouring counties and feedback loop effects from neighbouring counties to SSE-hosting counties. To 
our best knowledge those effects have not been analysed so far in any research on SSEs and SEZs in 
general. However, accounting for them is necessary for correct cost-benefits analysis of SEZs. As 
demonstrated by LESAGE and PACE (2009) ignoring them may result in bias and inconsistency of the 
estimator due to omitted variable problem. 
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents main conclusions from hitherto 
literature. Section 3 presents main features of SSEs giving special attention to the financial and non-
financial incentives provided by SSE to prospective investors as well as the territorial and institutional 
evolution of the scheme. Section 4 includes a presentation of the dataset followed by a brief overview of 
main stylized facts related to SSEs functioning in Poland. Section 5 presents analytical framework of the 
study indicating main channels through which SSE can influence employment and investments as well as 
estimation strategy including comparison with strategies used in most other studies on the topic. Section 6 
presents results of econometric modelling and elaborates on their economic implications and policy 
conclusions. Section 7 verifies the results’ robustness. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature. 
In the theoretical literature there is no hot debate on positive first round effects of SEZs (or tax incentives 
in general) on employment and investment (see, e.g. HOUSE and SHAPRIO, 2006; EDGE and RUDD, 
2010). However, the theoretical literature on their possible externalities is much less conclusive (see, e.g. 
FINDLAY, 1978; BLOMSTROM and WANG, 1992, RODRIGUEZ-CLARE, 1996; GLASS and 
SAGGI, 1998; MARKUSEN and VENABLES, 1997; JOHANSSON and NILSSON, 1997; LIU, 2008; 
LIN and SAGGI, 2005 and GE, 2012). It points out that the attraction to a given region of new companies 
that use more advanced technology or possess superior know-how (as in the case of most FDIs) than the 
ones present in that region can spur employment and investment in that region. However, in certain cases, 
some less competitive companies might be driven out of their markets or never be formed (crowded-out) 
by those new companies. 
The empirical studies on SEZs’ effects can be grouped according to the methodological approach they 
use. The first group of research includes mainly descriptive case studies concerning the evolution of 
particular SEZs. This strand of research gives special attention to the first round effects of SEZs. The 
studies of the second group conduct more formal econometric analyses. They usually make use of dummy 
variable or conceptually similar methods (e.g. difference-in-differences estimators) to evaluate the 
differences between SEZ-hosting and non-hosting regions. However, these studies most often do not 
differentiate between first round and induced effects of SEZs.  
A large part of the literature on Polish SSEs belongs to the first group and focuses on descriptive analyses 
based on case studies, evaluating the efficiency of SSEs in attracting new investment (in particular foreign 
direct investments (FDI)) without formal (quantitative) verification of the findings. The main conclusion 
drawn from this research is that SSEs increases the employment and investments (e.g. KRYŃSKA, 2000; 
KOZACZKA, 2008; ZASĘPA, 2010; RYDZ, 2003; SMOLEŃ, 2010; GWOZDZ and KWIECIŃSKA, 
2005; BYCZKOWSKA and KACZMAREK, 2010). However, these studies do not isolate the impact of 
SSE creation from the impact of exogenous economic conditions in the analysed regions. Moreover, 
although some authors indicate that the effects of SSEs vary across zones, they do not identify the factors 
behind these differences (e.g. CIEŚLEWICZ, 2009) or only list potential factors but do not analyse them 
quantitatively (e.g. GODLEWSKA-MAJKOWSKA and TYPA, 2008; PILARSKA, 2009; 
JARCZEWSKI, 2006; SMĘTKOWSKI, 2002; TROJAK and WIEDERMANN, 2009). A notable 
exception on that score is the study by JENSEN and WINIARCZYK (2014) who estimate the regional 
economic impact of SSEs with the use of panel data models base on dummy variable approach. 
Most empirical studies on SEZs in other countries, in particular in the US, France and the UK, belong to 
the second group. Their results are hardly conclusive, irrespective of the country under the study. 
Estimated effects rang from positive (see, e.g. CRISCUOLO et al., 2007; DEVEREUX et al., 2007; 
GIVORD et al., 2011; GIVORD et al., 2012 or MAYER et al., 2013), neutral (see, e.g. GOBILLION, 
2012 or NEUMARK and KOLKO, 2008) to even negative ones (see, e.g. BILLINGS, 2009). As indicated 
in, the predominant view is that they are positive albeit weak (see the literature review by, e.g. 
HIRASUNA and MICHAEL, 2005). Some analyses suggest that their strength depends on both pre-
existing regional economic conditions (e.g. GOSS and PHILLIPS, 2001; MAYNERIS and PY, 2013), as 
well as particular features of the zones (BONDONIO, 2003).  
The research on potential externalities from FDI, predominant type of SEZs investment, is similarly 
inconclusive. Some empirical studies point to the positive externalities (e.g. HASKEL et al., 2002; GORG 
and STROBL, 2001), while others identify negative spillovers (e.g. AITKEN and HARRISON, 1999; 
DJANKOV and HOEKMANN, 2000) and still others find no spillovers at all (e.g. KOKKO et al., 1996). 
The meta-analysis by GORG and STROBL (2001) suggests that the differences in the results obtained 
may be partly of a methodological background. Other authors indicate that the strength of positive 
externalities may depend on many variables such as the level of human capital in the region 
(BORENSZTEIN et al. 1998), the technology gap between domestic and foreign companies 
(HAVRANEK and IRSOVA, 2011) or the competitiveness of local market (BLOMSTROM et al., 2000). 
The ambiguity of empirical results points to the need of thorough analysis of channels through which 
SEZs influence regional economic performance. In particular, until now the first round and induced 
effects of SEZs have not been comprehensively analysed in separation. While the existence of positive 
first round effects of SEZs is not debated, the occurrence and sign of induced effects may depend on pre-
existing conditions in the regions where SEZs are located. Ignoring these effects can lead to biased 
estimates of benefits from SEZs. 
 
3. Special economic zones in Poland as a regional development policy tool. 
SEZ in Poland can be classified into three separate groups: (i) Specjalne Strefy Ekonomiczne, (ii) 
industrial and technological parks, (iii) duty-free zones and duty-free warehouses6. Only the first group 
(SSEs) is the subject of the following analysis. 
Specjalne Strefy Ekonomiczne (SSEs) are defined as administratively separated areas where investors are 
granted preferential conditions. SSEs are aimed at accelerating the development of selected parts of 
Poland primarily by creating new jobs, developing technologies, enhancing the competitiveness of 
produced goods and promoting exports. The main incentive offered by SSEs is income tax exemption on 
income earned from the business activity conducted within SSE, granted under condition of continuing 
operations and retaining employment for at least 5 years. Moreover, when applying for SSE designation 
or for a SSE-designated plot, companies declare the number of new jobs they plan to create and 
investment outlays they intend to realise. If the declarations are not met, the company might lose the SSE 
designation and be forced to return the financial aid granted. The level of tax exemption is determined by 
the amount of eligible costs (the qualified cost of a new investment or value of labour costs of new 
employees incurred over a 2-year-horizon) and so called maximum intensity of regional aid (amounting 
from 15% to 50% depending on the zone). Additionally, investors planning to locate in SSE are offered 
fully-equipped plots on preferential conditions and in some cases – depending on the decision of 
community (NUTS-5 aggregation level) – real estate tax exemptions. 
SSEs as a policy tool underwent a major evolution over its lifespan. The evolution pertained to every 
aspect of SSEs functioning, including the territorial span of the scheme as well as size and conditionality 
of financial aid granted to SSE-based companies. Table 1 summarizes this evolution. 
6 Industrial parks are groups of separated real estates with technical infrastructure left after the restructuring or liquidation of an 
enterprise that enables the conduct of business operations, especially for SMEs. In turn, a technology park is a separated group of 
real estates with technical infrastructure created to stimulate the flow of knowledge and technology between science institutions 
and enterprises. The areas of industrial and technological parks are small compared to those of SSEs. In fact, some of the parks 
lay within the boundaries of SSEs, making additional tax incentives available for the park investors. Duty-free zones and duty-
free warehouses are separated areas of Polish customs territory in which, regarding import duties and trade policy instruments, 
imported goods are considered to be outside the customs territory of Poland. They are created in order to facilitate the 
international transit of goods, especially in seaports, airports and areas adjacent to border crossings. 
                                                          
The first SSE in Poland, in Mielec, was established in 1995. Currently, SSEs form 14 groupings roughly 
covering all voivodeships of Poland (each grouping may operate in several voivodeships) and managed 
by separate administrators. The act of 1994 which introduced SSEs in Poland did not limit the overall 
territory of SSEs. However, during pre-accession dialog with the European Commission in 1999 Poland 
committed itself not to increase the SSE area above the already utilised territory of 6,325 ha. In 2004, 
a new solution was adopted. According to amended rules, the area available for SSEs was increased by 
1,675 ha to 8,000 ha. The new investment plots under SSE designation were offered to investors planning 
capital expenditure exceeding EUR 40 mn or generating employment of at least 500 persons. In 2006 the 
upper limit of SSE area was set at 12,000 ha and the conditions constricting the availability of new SSEs 
to large investment projects were removed. The limit has been increased again to 20,000 ha in 2008 and 
remains in force today. As of December 31, 2012 the utilised area of SSEs amounted to 15,800 ha 
(MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, 2013). What is important, SSE designation can be extended to plots owned 
both publically (by local governments) or privately (by companies). Until 2008, companies seeking a SSE 
designation on privately owned plots did not need to meet any additional criteria. Since 2008, SSE 
designation can be extended to private plots only if the company operates in one of innovative industries, 
plans to start production of new or substantially improved products or plans to substantially increase 
employment. In the last case, the number of newly created  jobs required from a company is dependent on 
the level of unemployment rate in the county relative to Poland’s average. If the upper territorial limit set 
in the Act on SSE is not exhausted, a new SSE may be created by Ministry of Economy decree after 
consultations with the relevant voivodeship and community administration. However, the Ministry of 
Economy requires a certain level of SSE designations utilisation at all times. In consequence, when a new 
SSE designation is to be extended and if, in consequence, the level of utilisation of SSE designated plots 
would fall, a previously extended and non-utilised SSE designation need to be revoked. 
*** Table 1 here *** 
4. Data and stylized facts 
The data we use come from two main sources: 
(i) Ministy of Economy company-level dataset on SSE-licensed firms’ operations. The dataset 
comprises in particular: annual data on newly created jobs, and retained employment (from the 
period prior to SSE creation) as well as capital expenditure. On top of that, the dataset covers the 
information on the sectors to which particular companies belong (based on Polish NACE 
equivalent classification) and area of each zone. The data included covers the period 2003-2012. 
Despite not covering the overall SSEs lifespan (beginning in 1995), the dataset is the most 
detailed existing source of information on economic activity in the SSEs. The disaggregated data 
include ca. 30,000 individual observations (individual company data in a given year). For the 
purpose of this study, the information contained in the Ministry of Economy dataset has been 
aggregated at the counties level (NUTS-4 classification7). This way of data aggregation aims at 
three goals. Firstly it allows to conduct the study at a territorial level at which heterogeneity 
within analysed units is much smaller than between units. This is especially pertinent from the 
point of view of labour market analysis for which other levels of data aggregation have serious 
limitations. For voivodeships level it is their large territorial size and consequently high diversity 
of economic conditions within their borders, while for community level - the limited availability 
of data concerning economic activity. Secondly, this level of data aggregation allows to 
distinguish balanced numbers of SSE hosting regions and regions without SSE in the analysis 
(e.g. in 2012 SSEs operated in 169 out of 379 counties, in 58 out of 66 subregions and in all 
voivodeships). As a consequence, it results in more precise estimates of SSEs impact at the given 
territorial level. Finally, the chosen aggregation level allows a direct analysis of differences in 
economic performance between SSE hosting and non-hosting counties as well as the spatial 
effects of SSEs operations which constitutes a significant contribution to the literature. After 
aggregating the data over counties we obtain 3790 annual observations. 
(ii) Regional macroeconomic data from the Central Statistical Office. The data includes in particular 
subsets of variables describing: (i) demographics (total population, number of persons in working 
age population, number of persons in post-productive age), (ii) labour market (employment, total 
unemployment, long-term unemployment, average wage in the corporate sector), (iii) corporate 
sector structure (number of registered companies, employment shares by main economic sectors – 
manufacturing, market and non-market services), (iv) local government finances (revenues, 
spending by main purpose – investment/social policy, budget balance). All data in this dataset 
either directly pertains to territories of counties or is aggregated from data for smaller 
administrative units of communities (NUTS-5 aggregation level). Unfortunately, given the 
territorial aggregation, data describing economic output in a comprehensive manner (GDP) is not 
available. The macroeconomic regional data described above cover the whole period for which 
SSE-based company-level data are available, in the same, i.e. annual, intervals. 
The initial data inspection leads to drawing the following stylized facts: 
(i) The SSE designation is an appealing investment incentive both for the authorities and prospective 
companies. In 2012, 1430 companies were located in SSEs created in 190 counties. The 
distribution of SSEs does not exhibit any significant concentration in a particular region of 
Poland, but is dispersed quite evenly in space (see Figure 1). The SSE-based employment rose 
fast, from 61 th in 2003 to 247 th in 2012, pointing to high attractiveness of SSE for investors and 
willingness of local governments to use this tool. 
7NUTS-3 level geographical aggregation in Poland covers 66 sub-regions. The sub-regions are formed of smaller administrative 
units called poviats (eng. counties). As of 2012 there were 379 counties in Poland.  
                                                          
*** Figure 1 here *** 
(ii) The SSE development was not even in time. Most of employment and investments in SSEs were 
created after Poland joined the EU in 2004. The upper limit of SSEs territory has been expanded 
accordingly. 
(iii) SSEs development was accompanied by inflow of FDI to Poland. In 2012, 81% of capital stock in 
SSEs came from foreign investors, and only 19% of capital was owned by Polish investors. 
German companies were the most important group of foreign investors, accounting for 16% of 
capital, followed by American firms – 12%, and investors from the Netherlands – 11%. Unlike 
Poland all those countries are at technological frontier.  
(iv) Counties hosting SSEs are very heterogeneous in terms of number of persons employed in SSE-
based companies. In 2012, the SSE-based employment ranged from 1 (sic!) to nearly 13 000 and 
its share in overall number of persons employed in the hosting counties varied from close to 0.0% 
to 23.9%. 
(v) SSEs attract mainly manufacturing companies. In 2012 they accounted for 96% of capital 
invested in SSEs. About two-thirds of the capital invested in SSEs were owned by low and 
medium-low technology companies, about 30% by medium-high technology firms and only 1% 
by high-tech companies (see Table 2). However, there are large differences between technology 
intensity profiles of particular regional groupings of SSEs (groups of SSEs managed by separate 
administrators). 
*** Table 2 here *** 
(vi) The development of SSE in very similar counties can differ substantially. A comparison of two 
neighbouring (and economically very similar) counties, hosting a SSE – Jastrzębie-Zdrój and 
Żory – provides an insightful example. While SSE in Żory increased the number of hosted 
companies and employment considerably between 2003 and 2012, the SSE in Jastrzębie-Zdrój 
saw a reduction in employment (see Table 3). Interestingly, the differences in economic 
performance during that period between Jastrzębie-Zdrój and Żory were not simple reflection of 
the differences in the SSEs’ development. 
*** Table 3 here *** 
(vii) However, counties hosting SSE seem to have outperformed in economic terms counties in which 
SSE has never existed. In 2003, when most of the SSE were still in their infancy, the former 
counties did not differ substantially in terms of economic performance from the latter counties 
(see Table 4). In particular, both groups of counties had similar unemployment (inclusive of long 
term unemployment) and labour participation rates. By contrast, in 2012 they differed on that 
score.  
*** Table 4 here *** 
 5. Analytical framework and estimation strategy. 
The mechanisms through which SEZs influence regional economic performance can be decomposed into 
four channels (see Figure 1): 
A. First round effects8: the impact of SEZ incentives on companies’ decisions to invest and create or 
retain employment in the SEZ designated territory; 
B. Induced effects: the effects induced by the functioning of SEZ-based companies in a delimited 
(geographically or administratively) region of SEZ location, but outside the SEZ territory itself. These 
effects can be attributed to a number of economic processes, which can give rise to both positive and 
negative impact on the overall economic performance of the region. On the one hand, the induced 
effects can include clustering of similar companies and vertical integration (backward and forward 
linkages). On the other hand, SEZ-based companies may crowd-out existing firms or prevent 
formation of new ones.  
C. Spatially induced effects: externalities to neighbouring regions. These induced effects might in 
principle take the same forms as the induced effects within the region of SEZ designation but 
materialise outside that region. Examples include hiring employees from outside hosting region. 
D. Reverse inductions: as the economic performance in regions neighbouring to the SEZ location can 
be altered by the economic zone designation, some induced effects (again positive and negative) from 
the neighbouring regions to the SEZ region might occur. 
*** Figure 2 here *** 
As indicated in Section 2 vast majority of the literature examines only channel A and B using dummy 
variable indicating zone existence in a particular region and time period. The variable is incorporated into 
(cross-section or panel data) standard model of regions’ employment or investment and the estimates are 
interpreted as the average impact of SEZ on the economic outcomes of a hosting region. Our study 
analyses channels B, C and D. We use employment and investments of firms located in SSE (i.e. first 
round effects or channel A) in particular county as explanatory variables in models describing counties 
respective economic activity. This approach, which to our best knowledge has not been used previously in 
the literature, enables us to avoid some principal limitations of dummy variable approach. Firstly, we are 
able to distinguish between first round (channel A) and induced (channel B) effects. This is not possible 
with the use of dummy variable. Secondly, dummy variable approach assumes that all SSEs are 
homogenous, while in fact they differ with respect to the scale of financial incentives, quality of 
infrastructure, available area etc. These results in considerable differences (both in time and cross-section 
8 The effects of channel A are called “direct impact” in the most of the literature. However in the following paragraphs we use 
methodology developed by LESAGE and PACE (2009) to interpret estimates from spatial panel models. They use the term 
“direct impact” to define the effects of channel B and D. To avoid confusion we label effects of channel A as “first round 
effects”. 
                                                          
dimension) with respect to the number, scale and characteristics of firms located in their territory. 
Dummy variable approach averages out these differences, which may result in biased estimates of SSEs’ 
impact on economic outcomes of hosting county. Our approach, on the contrary, fully exploits these 
differences. Thirdly, using SSE-based employment and investment as explanatory variables allows us to 
estimate models with fixed effects which capture unique characteristics of particular counties. In the 
dummy variable approach fixed effects are indistinguishable from the effects of SSE functioning. 
We analyse the impact of firms located in SSEs on two different measures of counties economic activity: 
total (including SSE-located companies) employment (empit) and total investment (capit)8F9,10. As 
creating jobs and attracting investment in distressed areas are the main goals of SSE functioning, this 
approach allows us to check if SSEs fulfil their role as a place-based policy. We start with two panel data 
models covering 379 counties in the period of 2003-2012 (3790 observations) of the form: empit = 𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 emp_sseit +  𝐗𝐢𝐭𝜸𝒆𝒎𝒑 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           (1) capit = 𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒cap_sseit +  𝐙𝐢𝐭𝜸𝒄𝒂𝒑 + 𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖            (2) 
where emp_sseit  and cap_sseit  describe activity of firms located in SSE (respectively, total employment 
and investment) in i-th county in year t; 𝐗𝐢𝐭 and 𝐙𝐢𝐭 are sets of control variables which determine, 
respectively, employment and investment in i-th county in year t but are not directly related to SSE 
functioning ; 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒,𝜸𝒆𝒎𝒑,𝜸𝒄𝒂𝒑 are structural parameters; 𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 and 𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 are fixed effects, which 
capture unique characteristics of i-th county; 𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are IID error terms. Variables in vectors 𝐗𝐢𝐭 and 
𝐙𝐢𝐭 are either standard determinants of regional employment and investment or the indicators capturing 
differences between SSE hosting and non-hosting counties identified in preliminary data inspection (see 
Table 4). In particular, vector 𝐗𝐢𝐭 consists of variables describing counties demographic structure (share 
of working age population in total population - work_ageit, share of individuals aged18-24 and share of 
individuals aged 55-59/6411 in working age population - youngit and oldit , respectively) and corporate 
sector characteristics (number of registered companies - firmsit , manufacturing production per inhabitant - 
ind_prodit and investments of firms located outside SSE – cap_non_SSEit). Vector 𝐙𝐢𝐭 contains variables 
characterizing county’s economy (share of population living in rural area in total county’s population – 
rur_popit ), corporate sector (ind_prodit and firmsit) and labor market (employment outside SSE - 
emp_non_SSEit). 
Estimates of 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 and 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 based on Model 1 and Model 2, respectively, allows to examine induced 
effects of SSE functioning described by channel B (see Figure 2) and should be interpreted as follows: 
9 It would be interesting to examine the impact of firms operating in SSEs on GDP, however the measure of output is not 
available at the county territorial disaggregation level.  
10 Detailed description of variables is presented in Table 5. 
11 The upper age limit in this respect is different for men (64) and women (59). 
                                                          
• 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 < 1 (𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 < 1) - SSE generates crowding-out effects in the hosting county replacing to some 
extend employment (investment) outside SSE with employment (investment) in SSE; if estimates of 
the parameter is not significantly different from zero than full crowding out takes place i.e. SSE 
employment (investment) is generated at the expense of employment (investment) in the hosting 
county, but outside SSE territory - the net effect of SSE designation for the hosting region is null;  
• 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 1 (𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 = 1) – SSE creates employment (attracts investment) to the hosting counties, but it 
does not have any additional impact (neither positive nor negative) on employment (investment) of 
companies located in this county but outside SSE territory; 
• 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 > 1 (𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 > 1) - SSE generates crowding-in effects in the hosting county which means 
activity of firms located in SSE exerts positive impact on employment (investment) of firms located 
in this county but outside SSE.  
Models 1 and 2 allows to examine induced effects of channel B but ignores possible impact of channels 
C and channel D which is equivalent to the assumption that the spatial effects of SSEs functioning are 
restricted only to the hosting counties. These assumptions seems very restrictive and counterintuitive: for 
example, firms located in SSEs may hire employees from neighboring counties and clustering or vertical 
integration of firms may spur investments in those counties. As indicated by LESAGE and FISCHER 
(2008), ignoring spatial dependence of this type may result in biased and inconsistent estimates due to 
omitted variable problem12. 
In order to take into account the above considerations we estimate panel Spatial Durbin Models 
(hereafter: SDM) of the form: empit = 𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝜌𝜌𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝐖𝐖𝐬𝐬𝐦𝐜𝐜)𝐢t + 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒empsseit + 𝐗it𝜸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝐖𝐖𝐬𝐬𝐦𝐜𝐜_𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬)it + 𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖         (3) capit = 𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 +  𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(𝐖𝐖𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜)it + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒capsseit + 𝐙it𝜸𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 +  𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(𝐖𝐖𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜_𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬)it + 𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖        (4)  
where W is an 379 × 379 weight matrix13, 𝜌𝜌𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒and 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 are spatial autoregressive coefficient of spatial 
lags of dependent variables ((𝐖𝐖𝐬𝐬𝐦𝐜𝐜)it and (𝐖𝐖𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜)it , respectively) and 𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 and  𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 are coefficients 
of spatial lags  (𝐖𝐖𝐬𝐬𝐦𝐜𝐜_𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬)it and (𝐖𝐖𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜_𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬)it. 
In Models 3 and 4 we assume that the only explanatory variable with spatial lag is emp_sseit and 
cap_sseit, respectively. If the assumption is not correct, than estimates of parameters 𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 and 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 may 
be biased due to omitted spatial dependence between, respectively, variables in vectors 𝐗𝐢𝐭 and empit or 
𝐙𝐢𝐭 and capit. In order to control for this issue in Models 5 and 6 the set of spatially lagged variables has 
been broadened with vectors 𝐗𝐢𝐭 and 𝐙𝐢𝐭:  
12 LESAGE and FISCHER (2008) show that a sufficient condition  for seemingly non-spatial linear regression resulting in both 
dependent and independent variables spatial lags is an omitted variable which follows the spatial autoregressive process. 
13 Construction of W has been discussed in details in the following paragraphs.  
                                                          
empit = 𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝜌𝜌𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝐖𝐖𝐬𝐬𝐦𝐜𝐜)𝐢t + 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒emp_sseit +  𝐗𝐢𝐭𝜸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝐖𝐖𝐬𝐬𝐦𝐜𝐜_𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬)it + (𝐖𝐖𝐗)𝐢𝐭𝜽𝒆𝒎𝒑 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (5) capit = 𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 +  𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(𝐖𝐖𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜)it + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒cap_sseit + 𝐙𝐢𝐭𝜸𝒄𝒂𝒑 +  𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(𝐖𝐖𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜_𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬)it + (𝐖𝐖𝐙)it𝜽𝒄𝒂𝒑 + 𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖       (6)  
where vectors 𝜽𝒆𝒎𝒑 and  𝜽𝒄𝒂𝒑 are vectors containing coefficients of spatial lags (𝐖𝐖𝐗)𝐢𝐭 and (𝐖𝐖𝐙)it. 
There are at least three important methodological aspects of Models 3-6 which should be considered. 
The first is the validity of SDM specification over many other spatial models developed in theoretical 
literature. We choose SDM for at least two reasons. Firstly, as noted by e.g. LESAGE and FISHER 
(2009) SDM nests most of other specifications used in empirical research including those with spatially 
autocorrelated error term like Spatial Error Model (hereafter: SEM). Secondly, SDM gives unbiased 
coefficient estimates also if the true data-generation process is SEM (see e.g. ELHORST, 2010). That 
being said, we check validity of SDM over SEM testing following hypothesis: H0:βemp + ρemp δemp = 0       (Model 3), H0:βcap + ρcap δcap = 0       (Model 4), H0:βemp + ρemp δemp = 0 ∩  𝛄𝐬𝐬𝐦𝐜𝐜 =   ρemp𝛉𝐬𝐬𝐦𝐜𝐜    (Model 5) and H0:βcap + ρcap δcap = 0 ∩  𝛄𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜 =  ρcap𝛉𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜     (Model 6). 
Rejection of particular hypothesis means that SDM specification properly describes the data. On the 
contrary, if the hypothesis is not rejected than the spatial dependence is due to spatially autocorrelated 
error term.  
The second issue is the choice of weight matrix structure. We construct W as inverse distance matrix 
based on geographic distance between centroids of every pair of counties. The matrix has been row-
normalized so that the sum of all elements in each row equals 1. We imposed a cut-off distance of 80 km 
beyond which weights are assumed to be zero. It creates sparse connectivity structure which according to 
LESAGE (2014) is suitable for empirical purposes. Since the average area of a county equals about 1000 
km2 the assumed cut-off distance is equivalent to assuming that firms located in SSE in one county exert  
impact on employment and investment of first and second-order neighbouring counties. Creating weight 
matrix based on rather ad hoc assumptions may seem unjustified, however as indicated by LESAGE and 
PACE (2014) it is a common mistake to believe that the estimates of spatial regression model depend 
strongly on the weight matrix specification14.That said, in Section 7 we check the robustness of results to 
changes in distance cut-off level as well as the way the distance between counties is measured.  
The third issue concerns valid interpretation of estimates from SDM. As indicated by LESAGE and 
PACE (2009) point estimates of spatially lagged variables cannot be directly used to test the hypothesis of 
spatial spillovers existence. In case of Models 3-6 it means that even positive and significant estimates of 
14 The authors show that this view is a byproduct of incorrect interpretation of estimates from spatial regression models.  
                                                          
𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒and 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 can not be interpreted as indication that SSE exerts positive impact on employment or 
investment outside hosting county. Based on LESAGE and PACE (2009) we construct matrices of partial 
derivative impacts of the form: 
𝜕𝐬𝐬𝐦𝐜𝐜
𝜕𝐬𝐬𝐦𝐜𝐜_𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬 = 𝑺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝐖𝐖) = �𝐈NT − 𝜌𝜌𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝐈T ⊗𝐖𝐖)�−1(𝐈NT𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + (𝐈T ⊗𝐖𝐖)𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒)           (7) 
        
𝜕𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜
𝜕𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜_𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬𝐬 = 𝑺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(𝐖𝐖) = �𝐈NT − 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(𝐈T ⊗𝐖𝐖)�−1(𝐈NT𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 + (𝐈T ⊗𝐖𝐖)𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒)           (8) 
and calculate three scalar summary measures for the impacts’ interpretation: 
• direct impact which is the average of diagonal elements of matrices (7) or (8); it measures the change 
in counties’ employment or capital accumulation due to the change in, respectively,  employment or 
investment of firms located in SSE hosted by this county; direct impact differs from estimates of 
𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 or 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 in Models 3 and 5 or Models 4 and 6, respectively; it measures the influence of SSE 
exerted not only through the channel B (induced effects), but also channel D (reverse inductions), 
since it includes also the impact arising from feedback loop: changes of dependent variable in i-th 
county creates an impulse to neighbouring counties, which in turn impacts dependent variable in 
i-th county; the scale of the feedback loop effects may be calculated as the difference between direct 
impact measure and 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 or 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 estimates; despite the difference that direct impact estimates 
includes channel B and D effects, while 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 and 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒  - only channel B effects, the  values of direct 
impact estimates should be interpreted in the same way as the estimates of  𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 and 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 in Models 
1 and 2 (i.e. direct impact>1: crowding in; direct impact<1: crowding out; direct impact= 1: neither 
crowding in nor crowding out); 
• indirect impact which is the average of the off-diagonal elements of matrices (7) or (8); it measures 
the cumulated change in employment or capital outlays outside SSE hosting county due to the change 
in, respectively,  employment or investment of firms located in SSE hosted by this county; indirect 
impact measures spatially induced effects of SSE activity described in channel C; positive and 
statistically significant value of the indirect impact indicates that the effects of SSE activity are not 
restricted to hosting county, but spill over to neighbouring counties; on the contrary, negative and 
significant estimates indicate that SSEs crowd-out employment or investment from neighbouring 
counties;  
• total impact which is the sum of direct and indirect impact; it measures the aggregated impact of SSE 
functioning exerted through channels B, C  and D.  
We estimate Models 1-6 using two estimators. We begin with fixed effects (FE), which assumes 
homogeneous coefficients of the explanatory variables, but allow for a different constant term for 
particular counties. The results may be biased due to several methodological problems. The first one is 
a possible cross-section dependence of error terms. In the analyzed model, this is equivalent to the 
assumption that there are unobserved time-varying omitted variables common for all counties, which 
impact individual counties differently. If these unobservable common factors are uncorrelated with the 
independent variables, the coefficient estimates based on FE are consistent, but standard errors estimates 
are biased. Therefore, we use the DRISCOLL and KRAAY (1998) nonparametric covariance matrix 
estimator (DK) which corrects for the error structure spatial dependence15. This estimator also addresses 
the second problem, namely standard errors bias due to potential heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of 
the error terms. The third problem is endogeneity due to potential correlation between the regressors and 
the error term. It is alleviated to some extent by using a wide range of control variables however it may 
not be fully eliminated. One of the possible solutions is to use the instrumental variables estimator. This 
estimator is asymptotically consistent yet it may be severely biased when applied to such short samples as 
ours. In Section 7 we assess the severity of the endogeneity problem through modifications to our base 
regressions i.e. restricting the sample to counties with SSE and enhancing the set of control variables. 
Taking into account all of the above restrictions, we use fixed effects (FE) and Driscoll-Kraay (DK) to 
estimate Models 1-6. That said, we are fully aware that our results ought to be treated with caution – at 
the very least due to estimation problems typical for panel datasets with as short time dimension as in our 
sample. 
 
6. Estimation results and implications 
Having time dimension in the data set, one should start with examination of variables’ stationarity. We 
use MADDALA and WU (1999) and PESARAN (2007) test16. Results presented in Table 5 indicate that 
all variables are stationary or trend-stationary.  
*** Table 6 here*** 
We begin with the analysis of employment models i.e. Model 1, 3, and 5. 
It follows from the Model 1 (see columns (1) and (2) of Table 7) that channel B contributes to an increase 
in employment in SSE hosting counties. Estimates of 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 amounts to 1.860 and are significantly higher 
than 1 for both FE and DK estimators (t-test p-values<0.01). Thus, every 100 jobs in firms located in SSE 
create on average 86 additional jobs in hosting counties outside the SSE.  
*** Table 7 here*** 
15 It should be stressed that this type of spatial dependence may be also present in Models 3-6 even if the hypothesis that SEM is 
the true data-generation process has been rejected. Note that in the SEM specification the error term structure is of the form 
𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝜌(𝐖𝐖𝐮)𝐢𝐭 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, while in DK estimator it is 𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 where 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
16 We are aware that the results of both tests may be biased. MADDALA and WU test assumes lack of cross-section dependence, 
which is actually the case for all analysed variables but is most suitable for short and fixed time dimension as in our sample. On 
the other hand, PESARAN test assumes cross-section dependence but T tending to infinity. Unfortunately, to our best knowledge 
no test addresses both of the shortcomings simultaneously.  
                                                          
In the next step we estimate Model 3 (see columns (3) and (4) of Table 7) which assumes that spatial 
effects of SSEs functioning are not restricted to the hosting counties. It allows us to directly test channel 
C and channel D of SSE functioning. Estimates of spatial autoregressive coefficient of total employment (𝜌𝜌𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒) and spatial lag coefficient of SSE-based employment (𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒) are jointly different from zero for 
both FE and DK estimators indicating that non-spatial specification of Model 1 is not valid. At the same 
time the estimates of 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 are statistically significant (for both FE and DK estimator p-value<0.01) and 
their value, 1.723, is similar to estimates received from Model 1. That said, to avoid erroneous 
conclusions we focus on the interpretation of direct and indirect impact (see column (1), (4) and (2), (5) 
of Table 8, respectively) instead of 𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 and 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 estimates. Estimates of direct impact of SSE-based 
companies’ employment amounts between 1.738 (for FE) and 1.743 (for DK) and are statistically higher 
than 1 for both FE and DK estimators (Chi2- test p-values<0.01). It confirms the results from Model 1 in 
terms of the existence and the size of channel B effects. The difference between direct impact and  𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 
estimates which amounts to 1.738-1.723=0.015 may be interpreted as the feedback-loop effects of 
channel D. The low value of this difference as well as lack of statistical significance indicate that reverse 
inductions from increased employment in i-th county to neighbouring counties and back to i-th county are 
negligible. In turn the estimates of indirect impact of emp_sseit variable are significant both statistically 
(z-test p-value<0.01) and economically. They amount between 1.368 (for FE) and 1.528 (for DK) 
indicating that an increase in SSE- based employment in a given county substantially increases the 
employment in neighbouring counties through spatially induced effects (channel C). The scale of these 
effects may seem surprising but as argued by LESAGE and FISCHER (2008) it cumulates the impact of 
changes in particular explanatory variable in one region on the dependent variable in all neighbouring 
regions. In the analysed case it adds up the impact of employment in SSE on all neighbouring counties, 
which explains relatively high value of the estimate. To confirm that the spatially induced effects are 
driven by spatially lagged variables and not by spatially autocorrelated error term we test the hypothesis H0:βemp + ρemp δemp = 0, which is rejected for both FE and DK estimator (Chi2- test p-values<0.01). 
*** Table 8 here*** 
Next, we estimate Model 5 which opposed to Model 3 includes full set of spatially lagged explanatory 
variables. There are no major differences between the two models (see columns (5) and (6) of Table 7 and 
(7) - (12) of Table 8): estimates of direct and indirect impacts are statistically significant (z-test p-
values<0.01), direct impact estimates are lower and indirect impact higher than in Model 3, but the 
differences are not significant. These similarities indicate that spatially-induced effects between 
employment in SSE-located companies and total employment in neighboring counties identified using 
Model 3, has not been driven by omitted spatial lags of remaining control variables. 
Then, we analyze investments models i.e. Model 2, 4, and 6. 
Estimates from the Model 2 (see columns (7) and (8) of Table 7) indicate that investments in SSE neither 
crowd in nor crowd out investments in hosting county outside the SSE. The estimates of 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 equals 
1.114 (for both FE and DK) and are not significantly different from 1 (t-test p-values>0.1).  
In turn, estimates from the Model 4 indicate (see columns (9) and (10) of Table 7 and (1) – (6) of Table 9) 
that in the case of investments there are no spatially induced effects (channel C effects do not exist):  𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒,  𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 and indirect impact estimates are statistically insignificant (p-values>0.1for both FE and DK 
estimator). Estimates of direct impact of SSE-based firms’ investment amounts between 1.092 (for FE) 
and 1.091 (for DK) and are not significantly different from 1 (Chi2- test p-values>0.1), confirming the 
results from the Model 2.  
*** Table 9 here*** 
Lastly, we estimate the Model 6 enhanced with full set of spatially lagged explanatory variables (see 
columns (11) and (12) of Table 7 and (7) – (12) of Table 9). The results are in line with the ones from the 
Model 4 as far as FE estimator is concerned: direct impact amounts to 1.088 and is not significantly 
different from 1 (Chi2- test p-values>0.1), whereas indirect impact is not statistically significant. In case 
of DK estimator indirect impact amounts to 0.326 and is statistically significant (z-test p-value<0.01). 
However, this result ought to be treated with caution as this is the only estimate in which variance-
covariance matrix has not been positive definite and spatial effects standard errors have been computed 
using a modified matrix according to the method proposed by REBONATO and JACKEL (2000).  
To sum-up, our results indicate that employment in SSE has substantial positive effect on employment 
outside the SSE. This effect is not restricted to the SSE hosting county, as assumed by channel B, but 
spills over to neighbouring counties in accordance with spatially induced effects of channel C.  Non-
spatial panel data approach which by assumption eliminates effects of this type, strongly underestimates 
the true impact of SSE on employment (that’s probably why our evaluation of SSEs effect on 
employment is more optimistic than in most other studies on SEZs). By contrast, reverse inductions or 
feedback loop effects of channel D are negligible. As far as investments are concerned the results show 
that SSE attract new capital to hosting counties (lack of crowding out effects) but does not crowd in 
investments outside the SSE, neither in hosting county nor in neighbouring counties. 
There are at least two possible complementary explanations of the results, both requiring careful 
examination, which goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
Firstly, SSE-based companies may induce employee commutations from nearby areas (e.g. hosting and 
neighbouring counties) thus spurring employment outside direct vicinity of SSE territory with 
insignificant  impact on investment. Furthermore, foreign owned companies, which dominate among 
SSE-based firms, offer their workers relatively high earnings. This constitutes additional purchasing 
power which is spent and thereby spur employment outside SSEs, in particular in services, which are 
labour intensive, but do not require large investments.  
Secondly, substantial positive effect of employment in SSEs on employment outside the SSEs and no 
effect of investments in SSEs on investments outside the SSEs could be explained by FDI dominance in 
the SSEs. Foreign-owned companies and domestic firms in Poland are not neck and neck competitors. 
The former ones (even those, which operate in low and medium-low technology industries) are generally 
more technologically advanced than the latter ones. Thus, they do not really compete (nor cooperate) with 
each other. In fact, foreign owned companies are often strongly integrated with international value chains. 
As a result, they might not require supplies from local companies and local markets are not necessarily 
their target markets. If this explanation was correct, then the positive effect of SSEs on employment and 
investments could falter with domestic firms climbing closer to technological frontier. The more similar 
the firms in and outside SSEs respectively, the larger the risk of SSEs causing serious distortions and 
thus, of crowding out effects. In this context, it is worth recalling that some studies for advanced 
economies identified faltering of benefits from SEZs in the long term (see, e.g. Gobillion, 2012). Hence, 
our more positive estimates of effect of SEZs on employment and investment than ones obtained in most 
other studies (cf. Section 2) may not stem only from the fact that we consider spatially induced effects 
that other studies ignore, but result also from the development gap between Poland that we do analyse, 
and advanced economies analysed in other studies. 
Regardless of which of the above interpretations is appropriate, existence of positive spatially induced 
effects, even if present only on the labour market, call for the debate on if and how costs of SSEs’ 
creation and functioning should be shared across local governments of SSEs hosting and non-hosting 
counties. However, designing a scheme for such a cost sharing would be extremely hard: possible 
faltering of benefits from SSEs would simultaneously change distribution of benefits between counties, 
which in turn imply a need for adjustment of a cost sharing scheme. Possible non-linearity in effects of 
SSEs of different characteristics  (another issue for future research) may complicate that task further.  
 
7. Robustness analysis 
In this section we check the robustness of the results on various changes in modelling approach. For the 
sake of brevity we present FE estimates only, since the results do not differ substantially when DK 
estimator is used.  
In part I of the analysis (see Table 10 columns (1) and (3)17) we check how estimates change when 
counties belonging to consecutive voivodeships are excluded from the sample. It allows to examine if the 
results are not driven by above-average impact of SSEs in particular area of the country. We analyse only 
non-spatial Models 1 and 2 as the spatial dependence structure is disturbed by exclusion of particular 
voivodeships. The estimates remain highly significant and their dispersion around the full-sample case is 
reasonably low. Having said that, estimates obtained with the exclusion of Lodzkie voivodeship are lower 
from the full-sample estimates, which suggest that the point estimate of coefficients for the entire sample 
should be treated with caution.  
Next, in part II we restrict the sample to counties which hosted SSE in any of the analysed years. If 
counties characterised by lower initial level of economic development were generally more likely to be 
chosen as SSE locations, than the catching-up process of these regions could inflate the observed impact 
of SSE designation on regional economic performance. The same problem would arise if general 
investment attractiveness of counties (not controlled for by the set of explanatory variables) was 
positively correlated with likelihood of obtaining SSE designation. We also cross-check the analysis with 
the approach described in part I i.e. exclusion of entire voivodeships from the sample18. The results (Table 
10, columns (2) and (4)) demonstrate that possible problem of endogeneity related to self-selection of 
counties for SSE designation is not an important issue in our analysis. It is worth stressing that this type 
of robustness check is not possible with dummy variable approach.  
*** Table 10 here*** 
Subsequently, in part III we check if changing explanatory variable in Model 5 from total SSE-based 
employment (emp_sseit) to the number of newly created jobs in SSE-based companies (emp_sse_newit)19 
affects the obtained results. This approach controls for the situation in which some of the already 
functioning companies have been included into SSE so their impact on hosting and neighbouring counties 
cannot be considered incremental. The significance of direct and indirect impact estimates20 remains 
virtually unchanged as compared to the estimates obtained for the basline specification. The only notable 
difference is that the direct impact estimate of SSE newly created jobs appear somewhat stronger than the 
effects pertaining to total SSE-based employment.  
*** Table 11 here*** 
17 We present only point estimates and t-statistics of βempand βcap for Models 1 and 2. Remaining estimates are 
available upon request.  
18 As in part I we analyse only Models 1 and 2. 
19 Companies investing in the SSEs are required to declare the number of jobs they intend to retain and create after 
obtaining SSE designation. These numbers are reported and controlled to determine if a given company qualifies for 
SSE-based benefits. 
20 Estimates of remaining parameters are available upon request. 
                                                          
Next, in part IV we check if the results are not driven by local governments spending. If SSE designation 
in particular county coincides with more generous public expenditure on e.g. active labour market policies 
or infrastructure it may create spurious correlation between activity of SSE-based companies and 
employment or capital outlays outside SSE. We control for this effect by broadening the set of 
explanatory variables to include local government social and investment expenditure per capita 
(social_expit, invest_expit) in Models 5 and 6, respectively. The results (Table 1221) seem unaltered by 
these changes, though estimates of direct and indirect impact for added variables prove significant. 
*** Table 12 here*** 
Finally, in part V, to evaluate robustness of the estimated spatial effects to the assumed spatial 
dependence structure we run Model 5 and 6 with the use of different weight matrices (Table 13). We 
construct three alternative weight matrices:  
• Centroids distance 60 km: inverse distance matrix based on geographic distance between centroids of 
every pair of counties with a cut-off distance of 60 km beyond which weights are assumed to be zero; 
• Capitals time 60m and Capitals time 90m: inverse distance matrix based on time needed to get by car 
from one counties’ capital to another, according to Google Maps22; cut-off distance beyond which 
weights are assumed to be zero is set at 60 and 90 minutes respectively. 
The results for both employment and investments model seem unaffected to the changes of the weight 
matrix: direct and indirect impact estimates and their significance is comparable to the ones from the 
baseline specification. 
*** Table 13 here*** 
In conclusion, the results are robust not only to the choice of different estimators (as shown in the 
previous section), but also to exclusions of some of the counties from the sample (part I and II), 
changes in the set of explanatory variables (parts III and IV) as well as alternative specifications 
of weight matrix (part V). Relatively small deviations are present in the robustness analysis, but 
they do not change our main conclusions. 
 
8. Conclusions. 
We find that SSEs have substantial positive effect on employment. Employment in a given SSE create 
employment of almost similar scale outside the SSE in hosting county and almost twice as large in 
21 We analyse only Model 5 and 6 and restrict presentation of the results to direct, indirect ant total impact estimates. 
Estimates of other models as well as of remaining parameters from Model 5 and 6 are available upon request. 
22 We used Google Distance Matrix API and the data has been gathered on 30th of January 2015. 
                                                          
neighbouring counties. Effect of SSEs on investments is weaker, but still positive. Investments in a given 
SSE do not crowd in investments outside the SSE, but do not crowd them out either. Hence, investments 
in SSEs add one to one to capital stock in hosting counties.  
Our findings are more optimistic than ones obtained in most other studies on SEZs. This difference may 
stem from the fact that we take into account spatially induced effects that other studies on the topic 
ignore. However, other explanations are also possible and require thorough examination. We leave it for 
future research along with the issues of faltering of benefits from SSEs in the long run, possible non 
linearity in effects of SSEs of different characteristics, design of fiscal cost sharing scheme, just to 
mention a few.  
Our results are robust to changes in estimation methods, sample composition, set of explanatory variables 
and spatial weight matrix. That said, they should be considered with some caution – at the very least due 
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Figure 1. Number of persons employed in SSE-based companies by county. 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Figure 2. Channels of SEZ influence on regional economic activity. 
 
Source: own elaboration 
  
2003 2012
Table1. Maximum financial aid in SSEs. 
Period Maximum financial aid in SSEs 
1995 – 2000 Total exemption from PIT and/or CIT of income earned during half the time of SSE existence (in principle 
during 10 years from the company start of operations in the zone), 50% exemption from PIT and/or CIT in the 
remainder of operations in the zone. 
2001 - 2003 The tax exemption limited to the maximum aid intensity cap set out for each region separately. The maximum 
aid caps are expressed as percentages of costs related to investment or employment (qualified costs) generated 
by the company in the zone. 
2004 - 2006 Increase of SSE available territory for large companies. From 1 May 2004 the maximum aid intensity caps were 
set at: 
 30% in the territory of Warsaw and Poznań 
 40% in the territory of Gdynia, Gdansk, Sopot, Krakow and Wroclaw 
 50% in the rest of Poland. 
2007 - 2013 The maximum aid intensity caps changed to: 
 40% in zachodniopomorskie, pomorskie, wielkopolskie, dolnośląskie, śląskie and mazowieckie (until 
2010) voivodeships; 
 30% in Warsaw and mazowieckie voivodeship (from 2011 on); 
 50% in the rest of Poland. 
2014 – now The maximum aid intensity caps changed to: 
 15% in Warsaw (1 July 2014 – 31 December 2017); 
 10% in Warsaw (1 January 2018 – 31 December 2020); 
 20% in Warsaw-West subregion; 
 25% in dolnośląskie, wielkopolskie, śląskie voivodships; 
 50% in lubelskie, podkarpackie, podlaskie, warmińsko-mazurskie voivodships; 
 35% in the rest of Poland. 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
Table 2. Structure of fixed capital (PLN) invested in SSE regional groupings by OECD technology 
intensity definition in 2012. 
 
Source: own elaboration, values in rows do not sum up to 100% as some of the PKD activity groupings (Polish equivalent of 
NACE classification) could not be assigned to a particular OECD technology intensity classes. 
high-tech medium-high-tech medium-low-tech low-tech
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Kamieniogórska 0% 19% 19% 18%
Katowicka 1% 55% 31% 12%
Kostrzyńsko-Słubicka 1% 26% 21% 51%
Krakowska 0% 30% 17% 12%
Legnicka 0% 57% 33% 9%
Łódzka 4% 11% 49% 39%
Mielecka 12% 26% 23% 38%
Pomorska 0% 4% 33% 63%
Słupska 0% 7% 40% 51%
Starachowicka 0% 15% 39% 46%
Suwalska 0% 1% 44% 55%
Tarnowska 0% 11% 66% 22%
Wałbrzyska 0% 37% 28% 35%
Warmńsko-Mazurska 0% 15% 22% 60%
Average 1% 30% 34% 32%
 
Table 3. Selected characteristics of two neighbouring SSE-hosting counties – Jastrzębie-Zdrój and Żory. 
 
Source: own calculations 
No of SSE-based 
companies
Employme
nt in SSE 






No of registered 
firms
persons mn PLN % labour 
force
PLN No per 10th pop.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Jastrzębie Zdrój 1 179 3.7 17.6 3197.7 607.0
Żory 3 311 37.8 24.3 1790.0 801.0
Jastrzębie Zdrój 1 154 15.4 8.7 5974.6 648.0
Żory 14 1313 462.6 10.1 3224.7 856.0
2012
2003
Table 4. Comparison of selected economic variables between SSE-hosting non-hosting counties. 
 
Notes: Counties hosting SSE - counties in which an SSE-based company operated for at least 1 year during 2003-2012. The ttest columns (4), (8) and (12) contain p-values of t-student test 
statistics for statistical significance of differences between average value of a given variable between SSE-hosting and non-hosting counties. Stars denote statistical significance at 1% (***), 














with SSE ttest (p)*
labour market (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
unemployment rate % 23.4 23.6 23.3 0.740 16.5 17.3 15.8 0.021**  -7.0 -6.3 -7.5 0.003***
long-term unemployment % 12.4 12.6 12.2 0.430 5.9 6.4 5.5 0.004*** -6.5 -6.2 -6.7 0.105
economic participation rate % 40.3 39.9 40.6 0.143 38.9 38.1 39.7 0.012** -1.3 -1.8 -1.0 0.012**
demographic dependency ratio % 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.386 1.6 1.7 1.6 0.055* 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.031**
average wage PLN 1952 1905 1994 0.002*** 3187 3108 3256 0.001*** 1234 1202 1262 0.012**
corporate sector
industrial production/population PLN/th persons 10116 7630 12295 0.000*** 21155 14584 26914 0.000*** 11039 6954 14619 0.000***
capital intensity PLN th 26.2 21.0 30.8 0.000*** 33.5 26.5 39.7 0.000*** 7.3 5.6 8.9 0.006***
REGON registered companies/population - 826 786 861 0.003*** 889 843 929 0.002*** 63 57 68 0.180
microcompanies/registered companies % 95.1 95.1 95.1 0.888 95.3 95.3 95.4 0.779 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.545
large companies/registered companies % 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.000*** 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.000*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.986
self employed/working age pop. % 10.6 10.3 10.8 0.046* 10.5 10.1 10.9 0.006*** -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.033**
manufacturing employment/total emp. % 28.6 25.1 31.7 0.000*** 28.3 24.8 31.3 0.000*** -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 0.886
market services employment/ total emp. % 19.4 17.1 21.4 0.000*** 19.9 18.4 21.2 0.003*** 0.5 1.4 -0.2 0.000***
non-market services employment/ total emp. % 21.1 20.8 21.3 0.424 21.4 20.6 22.0 0.058* 0.3 -0.2 0.7 0.014**
local government finances
revenues/ working age pop. PLN th 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.727 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.762 2.1 2.1 2.1 0.827
invest. exp./ working age pop. PLN th 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.576 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.473 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.603
social. exp./ working age pop. PLN th 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.891 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.050** 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.014**
budget balance % -2.1 -2.2 -2.0 0.613 -0.4 -0.5 -0.1 0.330 1.8 1.7 1.9 0.694
2003 2012 delta 2012-2003
Table 5. Variables definitions and sources. 
 
  
Variable Name in models Definition Source
Variables concerning SSE functioning
Employment in SSE emp_sse - Total employment in SSE firms in a given county, including both retained jobs of firms 
functioning prior to SSE designation and newly created jobs after SSE designation
own calculation based on Ministry of Economy data
New employment in SSE emp_sse_new - Newly created jobs in SSE-based companies after SSE designation own calculation based on Ministry of Economy data
Employment excluding SSE emp_non_sse - Employment in a county exluding employment in SSE firms, computed as a difference between 
employment in a given county (emp) and total employment of SSE firms (emp_sse)
own calculation based on Ministry of Economy and 
Central Statistical Office data
Capital in SSE cap_sse mln PLN Capital outlays in SSE firms; computed as amortized capital stock in previous year plus real 
value of capital investment undertaken during the year
own calculation based on Ministry of Economy data
Capital outside SSE cap_non_sse mln PLN Capital outlays of frims located outside SSE, computed as a difference between total capital 
outlays in a given county (cap) and capital oultays of SSE firms (cap_sse)
own calculation based on Ministry of Economy and 
Central Statistical Office data
Regional macroeconomic data
Employment emp - Average employment in a county, computed as number of unemployed persons divided by the 
unemployment rate minus the number of unemployed persons
own calculation based on Central Statistical Office data
Capital cap mln PLN Value of gross fixed assets in the corporate sector (enterprises employing more than 9 persons) Central Statistical Office
Industrial production ind_prod PLN Industiral production per inhabitant, computed as value of industrial production sold by 
companies registered in a county divided by the number of the county inhabitants
Central Statistical Office
Rural population rur_pop per cent Share of population living in rural area in total population of a county Central Statistical Office
Working age population work_age per cent Share of working age population 18-59/64 (women/men) in total population of a county Central Statistical Office
Old working age population old per cent Share of individuals aged 55-59/64s (women/men)  in total working age population of a county Central Statistical Office
Young working age population young per cent Share of individuals aged 18-24 in total working age population of a county Central Statistical Office
Number of firms firms - Number of firms  in National Office Business Register (REGON) per 10000 inhabitants Central Statistical Office
Social expenditures social_exp th PLN Social expenditures of local governments (counties and communities) per 1 person in working 
age
own calculation based on Central Statistical Office data
Investment expenditures investment_exp th PLN
Investment expenditures of local governments (counties and communities) per 1 person in 
working age own calculation based on Central Statistical Office data
Table 6. Panel unit root tests. 
 
Notes: Upper panel reports the results of MADALLA and WU (1999) panel unit root test. Results shown are chi-square statistics. Lower panel reports the results of PESERAN (2007) panel 
unit root test (CIPS). Results are Zt-bars. Stars denote rejection of null hypothesis of nonstationarity of panels at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels. 
 
Variables:
emp work_age old young firms cap_non_SSE ind_prod cap rur_pop emp_non_sse emp_sse cap_see
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Levels No 0 466.764 396.310 331.773 627.799 2167.391*** 1005.392*** 732.299 800.411 715.396 497.377 587.414*** 379.907
Levels No 1 701.743 1013.704*** 805.079 536.270 841.212** 1161.330*** 1451.495*** 1196.685*** 759.702 713.771 701.416*** 665.505***
Levels No 2 773.033 693.269 555.207 1469.657*** 1297.951*** 1197.947*** 1917.866*** 1177.242*** 1203.210*** 712.776 755.157*** 798.737***
Levels Yes 0 516.070 1308.8*** 3970.489*** 40.486 933.990*** 693.170 474.808 604.617 741.547 528.828 439.785* 403.706
Levels Yes 1 807.535 483.350 1966.228*** 172.631 436.808 658.513 542.634 661.308 481.005 786.006 899.969*** 789.759***
Levels Yes 2 1148.342*** 695.112 1603.332*** 812.673* 1034.225*** 862.981*** 833.338** 849.560** 869.601*** 1039.411*** 675.641*** 1178.377***
Dif. No 0 2090.254*** 1457.400*** 962.613*** 1162.389*** 5061.809*** 3338.958*** 2577.257*** 3029.7568** 2472.630*** 2171.132*** 1343.501*** 1132.820***
Dif. No 1 1508.059*** 1555.635*** 1126.442*** 612.428 1151.955*** 1907.578*** 2320.247*** 1917.481*** 1323.468*** 1557.324*** 847.547*** 1053.291***
Dif. Yes 0 1438.042*** 1267.859*** 1822.554*** 580.594 3976.751*** 2689.631*** 2094.348*** 2537.249*** 1917.734*** 1490.419*** 1101.003*** 1020.143***
Dif. Yes 1 1805.264*** 1865.735*** 1889.946*** 976.741*** 1054.212*** 1786.959*** 2297.887*** 1618.688*** 1566.967*** 1810.495*** 1011.872*** 986.557***
Levels No 0 -12.858*** 18.088 1.465 3.933 6.804 0.356 5.668 -1.445* 6.158 -12.055*** 5.244 1.471
Levels No 1 0.450 23.893 -5.092*** -1.176 -2.288** 3.822 3.569 0.265 5.080 0.412 3.246 -2.485***
Levels No 2 48.364 48.364 48.364 48.364 48.364 48.364 48.364 48.364 48.364 48.364 35.308 35.308
Levels Yes 0 -2.303** 25.242 -2.407*** 13.548 -5.653*** -6.874*** -1.863** -6.938*** 18.647 -1.013 4.929 -0.739
Levels Yes 1 -5.934*** 23.962 0.755 10.505 -9.599*** -1.84** 3.480 -2.498*** 20.185 -4.45*** 6.401 -3.181***
Levels Yes 2 62.472 62.472 62.472 62.472 62.472 62.472 62.472 62.472 62.472 62.472 43.872 44.803
Dif. No 0 -29.978*** 8.190 -9.141*** -7.379*** -3.444*** -16.652*** -14.467*** -17.066*** -2.238** -29.466*** -0.167 25.634
Dif. No 1 -6.215*** 22.574 -11.824*** -6.907*** -7.213*** -2.864*** -1.022 -6.660*** 2.385 -6.429*** 0.622 25.907
Dif. Yes 0 -18.487*** -0.133 -2.898*** 0.104 6.240 -12.004*** -9.543*** -12.071*** 0.198 -18.841*** 2.971 22.451








Table 7. Estimation results. Panel and spatial panel models of county-level employment and investment. 
 
Notes: The estimated models are Models 1 to 6 presented in section 5. Variables definitions are reported in Table 5. Presented regressions were carried out using fixed effects (FE) and Driscoll –
Kraay (DK) estimators. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics in case of non-spatial models (Model 1 and 2) and z-statistics for SDM models (Models 3, 4, 5 and 6). Numbers in parentheses for SDM 
vs. SEM and SDM vs. non-spatial model tests are p-values for respective test statistics (the tests are presented in Section 5). Stars denote coefficient estimates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% 
(*) levels.  
Dependent variable:
FE DK FE DK FE DK FE DK FE DK FE DK
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1.860*** 1.860*** 1.723*** 1.723*** 1.559*** 1.559*** 1.114*** 1.114*** 1.0941*** 1.094*** 1.088*** 1.088***
(24.180) (12.100) (23.480) (13.863) (22.558) (18.343) (12.400) (9.260) (12.568) (9.430) (12.495) (9.524)
0.068*** 0.068 0.040*** 0.040 0.122*** 0.122** -29.278** -29.278** -29.030** -29.030*** -39.876*** -39.876***
(4.220) (1.410) (2.585) (0.923) (7.818) (2.087) (-2.080) (-2.590) (-2.155) (-3.838) (-2.909) (-3.951)   
9.763 9.763 -230*** -230** -1000*** -1000*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.054***
(0.170) (0.070) (-3.851) (-2.000) (-7.718) (-7.083) (13.860) (4.080) (14.364) (4.303) (14.387) (4.152)
-154.885* -154.885 -160** -160 -1800*** -1800*** 0.308*** 0.308*** 0.310*** 0.310*** 0.310*** 0.310***
(-1.940) (-0.590) (-2.084) (-0.868) (-17.682) (-5.512) (33.570) (5.140) (35.076) (5.825) (33.710) (5.305)
1.461*** 1.461*** 1.434*** 1.434*** 1.546*** 1.546*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(37.560) (10.100) (39.142) (9.323) (44.227) (11.440) (9.350) (5.050) (9.425) (4.508) (9.189) (4.207)
1.035*** 1.035*** 0.983*** 0.983*** 0.913*** 0.913***
(13.750) (3.570) (13.912) (3.642) (13.803) (3.522)
-0.01 -0.01 -0.012* -0.012* -0.013** -0.013***
(-1.580) (-1.290) (-1.953) (-1.881) (-2.214) (-2.601)
0.919*** 0.919*** 0.788*** 0.7883** 0.276 0.276 0.26 0.260***
(4.691) (2.841) (3.639) (2.066) (1.360) (1.229) (1.021) (3.712)
-0.037 -0.037 137.605*** 137.605***
(-0.984) (-0.945) (3.979) (7.890)
1400*** 1400*** NA NA NA NA -0.020** -0.02*
(8.748) (7.370) (-2.256) (-1.959)   
2500*** 2500*** NA NA NA NA -0.021 -0.021
(17.707) (6.235) (-0.886) (-0.412)   
-0.845*** -0.845*** NA NA NA NA -0.001 -0.001
(-8.153) (-4.238) (-0.201) (-0.165)   
-0.073 -0.073 NA NA -0.029 -0.029 0.034 0.034
(-0.363) (-0.425) (-1.090) (-0.559) (0.907) (1.050)
0.039** 0.039**
(2.005) (2.216)
0.158*** 0.158* 0.295*** 0.295***
(6.331) (1.760) (9.296) (8.471)
N 3790 3790 3790 3790 3790 3790 N 3790 3790 3790 3790 3790 3790
R2 0.71 0.71 0.98 0.98 0.986 0.986 R2 0.666 0.666 0.898 0.898 0.864 0.864
90.23 8.18 640.03 10929.44 2.13 1.53 25.88 1014.87
(0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.344) (0.465) (0.000) (0.000)
41.35 7.27 255.7 405.78 1.62 1.55 24.25 528.35
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Table 8. Estimation results. Spatial panel models of county-level employment. LeSage and Pace (2009) spatial impact decomposition. 
 
Table 9. Estimation results. Spatial panel models of county-level investment. LeSage and Pace spatial impact decomposition. 
 
Notes to Tables 8 and 9: The estimated models are Models 3 to 6 presented in section 5. Variables definitions are reported in Table 5. Presented regressions were carried out using fixed effects (FE) 
and Driscoll–Kraay (DK) estimators. Direct, indirect and total impact definitions are given in section 5. Z-statistics for coefficient estimates are given in parentheses. Stars denote estimates 
significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels. 
Dependent variable:
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1.738*** 1.368*** 3.106*** 1.743*** 1.528** 3.266*** 1.594*** 1.762*** 3.356*** 1.594*** 1.779*** 3.373***
(28.132) (6.603) (14.458) (16.258) (2.084) (4.406) (27.265) (6.229) (11.434) (22.913) (2.659) (5.082)
0.041** 0.007*** 0.048* 0.043 0.014 0.057 0.123*** -0.003 0.120* 0.126** 0.013 0.139
(2.442) (2.584) (2.490) (0.941) (0.798) (0.927) (7.053) (-0.0579) (1.975) (2.025) (0.155) (0.984)
-230.00*** -41.930*** -270.0*** -230* -57.955 -290 -980.00*** 1500.0*** 515.496*** -980.00*** 1500.0*** 494.995***
(-3.554) (-2.774) (-3.473) (-1.925) (-1.051) (-1.720) (-7.039) (8.179) (4.503) (-6.483) (7.082) (4.924)
-150.0** -28.266* -180.0* -140 -10.296 -150 -1700.0*** 2800.0*** 1000.0*** -1700.0*** 2800.0*** 1000.0***
(-2.070) (-1.902) (-2.063) (-0.736) (-0.234) (-0.677) (-18.223) (15.936) (7.084) (-5.558) (6.395) (4.867)
1.444*** 0.264*** 1.708*** 1.442*** 0.286* 1.728*** 1.542*** -0.538*** 1.004*** 1.540*** -0.531*** 1.009***
(41.938) (5.817) (27.149) (9.480) (1.653) (10.968) (46.769) (-3.722) (6.664) (11.763) (-2.810) (6.124)
0.975*** 0.178*** 1.152*** 0.955*** 0.172* 1.127*** 0.908*** 0.239 1.147*** 0.873*** 0.235 1.107**
(13.993) (5.721) (13.718) (3.282) (1.758) (3.903) (13.598) (0.939) (4.164) (3.248) (1.083) (3.079)
-0.011* -0.002* -0.013 -0.011* -0.002 -0.012 -0.011* 0.05* 0.04 -0.011** 0.049* 0.038










SDM panel with emp_sse spatially-lagged
FE (3) DK (4)
SDM panel with all variables spatially-lagged 
Model 3
ind_prod
FE (5) DK (6)
Dependent variable:
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1.092*** 0.267 1.359*** 1.091*** 0.245 1.336*** 1.088*** 0.362 1.450*** 1.087*** 0.324*** 1.411***
(14.745) (1.445) (7.562) (11.150) (1.400) (5.490) (14.751) (1.353) (5.476) (11.262) (3.348) (11.591)
-29.015** 0.917 -28.097** -29.476*** 1.208 -28.269*** -39.467*** 137.507*** 98.039*** -40.260*** 142.737*** 102.477***
(-2.242) (0.893) (-2.241) (-3.748) (0.704) (-4.106) (-3.011) (4.316) (3.105) (-3.706)   (7.688) (8.378)
0.053*** -0.002 0.051*** 0.053*** -0.002 0.052*** 0.054*** -0.019** 0.035*** 0.055*** -0.019**  0.035***
(14.382) (-1.132) (12.759) (4.925) (-0.597) (4.567) (14.419) (-2.204) (3.935) (4.763) (-1.977)   (3.827)
0.311*** -0.01 0.301*** 0.313*** -0.012 0.301*** 0.310*** -0.01 0.300*** 0.313*** -0.015 0.297***
(31.934) (-1.144) (26.977) (6.124) (-0.687) (7.808) (30.710) (-0.460) (14.422) (5.576) (-0.284)   (23.172)
0.013*** -0.0004 0.012*** 0.013*** -0.0005 0.012*** 0.013*** -0.0009 0.012*** 0.013*** -0.0003 0.013***




FE (9) DK (10)






FE (11) DK (12)
Model 6
SDM panel with all variables spatially-lagged 
Table 10. Robustness analysis part I and II. Models 1 and 2 estimated using limited sample. 
 
Notes: Table 10 reports coefficient estimates for emp_sse and cap_sse. The estimated models are Models 1 and 2 presented in 
section 5. Variables definitions are reported in Table 5. Presented regressions were carried out using fixed effects (FE) estimator. 
Columns (1) and (3) present results for the sample including SSE-hosting and non-hosting counties, while columns (2) and (4) 
present results for a sample including only the SSE-hosting counties (in which a SSE-designated company operated in at least 
one year). Subsequent rows present estimation results obtained by including counties belonging to all voivodships in the sample 
or excluding from the sample counties belonging to a given voivodship. t-statistics for coefficient estimates are given in 
parentheses. Stars denote estimates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels. 
Dependent variable:
all counties
counties with SSE operating 
for at least 1 year all counties
counties with SSE operating 
for at least 1 year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1.8597*** 1.8034*** 1.1136*** 1.1555***
(12.0956) (11.1154) (9.2551) (8.2089)
Excluded conties belonging to 
the indicated voivodeship:
2.005*** 1.941*** 1.459*** 1.490***
(13.299) (11.609) (11.666) (10.903)
1.909*** 1.837*** 1.169*** 1.208***
(11.297) (10.454) (9.175) (8.177)
1.872*** 1.826*** 1.134*** 1.171***
(12.177) (11.310) (8.989) (7.902)
1.873*** 1.814*** 1.125*** 1.154***
(12.064) (11.232) (9.357) (8.185)
1.488*** 1.394*** 0.854*** 0.896***
(9.102) (8.231) (8.167) (7.973)
1.7641*** 1.7189*** 1.0933*** 1.1431***
(11.5764) (10.524) (8.227) (7.4441)
1.723*** 1.677*** 0.957*** 0.952***
(11.778) (10.958) (10.123) (8.561)
1.867*** 1.811*** 1.141*** 1.186***
(11.934) (10.864) (9.400) (8.261)
1.924*** 1.867*** 1.124*** 1.174***
(11.293) (10.431) (9.276) (8.237)
1.854*** 1.811*** 1.118*** 1.161***
(11.850) (10.964) (9.114) (8.151)
1.858*** 1.788*** 1.148*** 1.210***
(11.331) (10.371) (9.625) (8.751)
1.906*** 1.858*** 1.107*** 1.176***
(11.04) (10.583) (8.256) (7.139)
1.877*** 1.821*** 1.113*** 1.153***
(12.110) (11.097) (9.217) (8.141)
1.882*** 1.821*** 1.107*** 1.150***
(12.070) (11.052) (9.004) (7.861)
2.004*** 1.955*** 1.107*** 1.156***
(12.577) (11.559) (8.775) (8.038)
1.863*** 1.808*** 1.100*** 1.144***




















Table 11. Robustness analysis part III. Models 3 and 5 with emp_sse replaced with emp_sse_new. 
 
Notes: The estimated models are Models 3 and 5 presented in section 5. Variables definitions are reported in Table 5. Presented 
regressions were carried out using fixed effects (FE) estimator. Direct, indirect and total impact definitions are given in section 5. 
Z-statistics for coefficient estimates are given in parentheses. Numbers in parentheses for SDM vs. SEM and SDM vs. non-
spatial model tests are p-values for respective test statistics. Stars denote coefficient estimates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 
10% (*) levels.  
Dependent variable:
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2.101*** 1.558*** 3.659*** 1.960*** 1.381*** 3.341***
(21.012) (5.314) (11.545) (26.781) (3.555) (8.329)
0.027 0.007 0.034 0.118*** 0.044 0.162***
(1.577) (1.639) (1.595) (6.721) (0.857) (2.659)
-240*** -62.092*** -300*** -920*** 1400*** 514.043***
(-4.759)   (-3.500)   (-4.553)   (-6.561) (7.745) (4.361)
-230*** -59.476*** -290*** -1800*** 2900*** 1100***
(-3.489)   (-3.011)  (-3.448)   (-19.319) (16.489) (7.211)
1.432*** 0.361*** 1.793*** 1.527*** -0.540*** 0.987***
(41.354) (7.150) (26.751) (46.144) (-3.608) (6.34)
1.028*** 0.259*** 1.287*** 0.962*** 0.527** 1.489***
(14.654) (6.866) (14.249) (14.371) (2.005) (5.213)
-0.014** -0.003**  -0.017**  -0.013** 0.089*** 0.075**























Table 12. Robustness analysis part IV. Models 5 and 6 estimated with additional explanatory variables: 
social_exp and invest_exp respectively. 
 
Notes: The estimated models are Models 5 and 6 presented in section 5. Variables definitions are reported in Table 5. Presented 
regressions were carried out using fixed effects (FE) estimator. Direct, indirect and total impact definitions are given in section 5. 
Z-statistics for coefficient estimates are given in parentheses. Numbers in parentheses for SDM vs. SEM and SDM vs. non-
spatial model tests are p-values for respective test statistics. Stars denote coefficient estimates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 
10% (*) levels.  
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1.579*** 1.600*** 3.179*** cap_sse 1.085*** 0.315 1.400***
(26.996) (5.715) (11.066) (14.744) (-1.119) (5.010)
0.117*** -0.022 0.094 rur_pop -37.468*** 137.323*** 99.854*** 
(6.670) (-0.406) (1.523) (-2.8768)   (-3.652) (2.676)
-1000*** 1400*** 362.056*** emp_non_sse 0.053*** -0.018* 0.035***
(-7.202) (6.844) (2.773) (-13.807) (-1.8636)   (3.599)
-1700*** 2500*** 797.154*** firms 0.311*** -0.013 0.298***
(-18.135) (12.733) (4.610) (31.458) (-0.581)   (13.546)
1.545*** -0.495*** 1.050*** ind_prod 0.013*** -0.0001 0.013***
(46.657) (-3.908) (7.821) (8.310) (-0.037)   (3.371)
0.894*** 0.19 1.083*** invest_exp 210*** -220*** -9.700





























Table 13. Robustness analysis part V. Models 5 and 6 estimated with alternative spatial weight matrices.  
 
Notes: Table 10 reports coefficient estimates for emp_sse and cap_sse. The estimated models are Models 5 and 6 presented in 
section 5. Variables definitions are reported in Table 5. Presented regressions were carried out using fixed effects (FE) estimator. 
Z-statistics for coefficient estimates are given in parentheses. Direct, indirect and total impact definitions are given in section 5. 
Stars denote coefficient estimates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) levels 
 
Dependent variable:
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Basic specification:
1.594*** 1.762*** 3.356*** 1.088*** 0.362 1.450***
(27.265) (6.229) (11.434) (14.751) (1.353) (5.476)
Alternatvie specification:
1.660*** 1.708*** 3.368*** 1.086*** 0.417* 1.503***
(28.380) (8.280) (15.4007) (14.780) (1.900) (6.810)
Capitals time 60m 1.623*** 1.559*** 3.182*** 1.099*** 0.531*** 1.630***
(21.468) (9.565) (16.764) (14.948) (2.958) (8.692)
Capitals time 90m 1.582*** 2.026*** 3.608*** 1.086*** 0.563**  1.648***
(21.251) (10.532) (17.887) (14.733) (2.546) (7.318)
emp cap
Weight matrix
Centroids distance 60 km
Centroids distance 80 km
